Political squabbles between President Ashraf Ghani and his predecessor Hamid Karzai are about to hog the headlines in the media. Afghanistan’s chequered history shows that similar rifts and internecine bickering had led to the fall of Khalq and Parcham governments.

Ghani’s unity government has been struggling with a whole host of problems, including implacable opposition from former mujahideen leaders and Karzai. But the president has been able to stonewall the creation of a powerful opposition alliance, led by Prof. Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf.

Of course, Karzai has been supportive of Prof. Sayyaf against Ghani. After its establishment, the eight-party alliance of ex-jihadi groups announced support to the new president. Gradually, however, Sayyaf decided to deal with the government from the platform of the Mujahideen Council.

Now that some of the members of Karzai’s team stand firmly behind Ghani while others are likely to follow suit, the sitting administration will feel strengthened for the moment — but not as much as the president and his supporters expect. This sense of political muscle and spine should not be misconstrued as a bankable shield in the rough and tumble of Afghan politics. 

Karzai has already taken some fundamental, though sly, steps to pave the ground for the overthrow of the present government. The association of former governors, who still wield enormous influence in their provinces, is one astute move toward mounting pressure on the Ghani administration, undermining it from within and provoking the masses not to trust it.

The ex-president has a large number of supporters in both houses of parliament — the Meshrano Jirga to convene.

Many believe Ghani may not keep the promises he has held out to former mujahideen, who may eventually swing behind the erstwhile president. Additionally, Chief Executive Officer Dr. Abdullah also suggests he had been marginalised. Ex-leaders and commanders of the now defunct Northern Alliance are also dissatisfied with Abdullah.

Meanwhile, Ghani seems to be in an all-out push to win them over. He is desperately trying to woo Yunus Qanuni, Bismillah Mohammadi, Amrullah Saleh and others. With this in mind, Abdullah thinks he will be the end-loser. In future, he may also lend his weight to Karzai if Indian or Russian efforts toward this end come to fruition.

Importantly, Karzai had forged robust relations with China and Russia during his 14-year presidency. He is known to enjoy cordial ties to India. Being Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour, Iran has a greater rapport with Karzai than Ghani. Pakistan has also realised its links to the incumbent president are not as strong and reliable as it expected.

With the 2016 electoral battle for the White House approaching, a Republican win may turn the game in favour of Karzai. The Republicans would not cling to the choice of Democrats — namely Ghani, who will be forced to strike compromise with them and accept the presence of American forces and other inordinate demands.

For obvious reasons, the incumbent president is endeavouring to scuttle his predecessor’s attempts to convene the Loya Jirga and set store by evolving national consensus on key issues concerning Afghanistan’s future. He may bring together some political figures, jihadi leaders and tribal elders to endorse the so-called consensus charade in return for certain perks and privileges.

But I do not think the jirga’s recommendations will be implemented because only the National Security Council (NSC) has the authority to execute such suggestions.

On the other hand, the ex-president wants the Loya Jirga to declare the present unity government as a total failure. He will love to see the grand tribal assembly asking the government to resign, naming a new leader and calling for a peaceful transfer of power.

But Karzai does not have the authority to convene the Loya Jirga. By the same token, the present government cannot call it into session either, because the Wolesi Jirga tenure has already expired. Drawing on this constitutional vacuum, the then head of state may issue a call for the traditional jirga to convene.

Karzai’s supporters are spreading propaganda the unity government has fallen flat and its replacement is an imperative to safeguard the supreme national interest. By doing so, they are endeavouring to neutralise any public aversion to the Loya Jirga and participate therein.

While working on this crafty agenda, they are out to create the impression that they are harbouring no grudge against the national unity government and favour an understating on the transfer of power to the Karzai camp.

Initially, Karzai’s team worked behind the scenes to convene the Loya Jirga jointly with the government and convince Ashraf Ghani to agree to this proposition. But Dr. Anwarul Haq Ahady cautioned the erstwhile president he would not gain anything from the tribal gathering, 30 percent of whose participants would be proponents of Ghani, another 30 percent of Abdullah and as many ordinary people. The remaining 10 percent would be Karzai backers.

In order to queer the pitch for the government, Ahady reportedly suggested the most workable line of action would be a push for snap elections. Some of the people have already rejected the previous presidential vote. But the prevailing security situation would not allow fresh elections. Therefore, Karzai is sticking to the Loya Jirga option, even the consent of the government. Firstly, if Taliban Afghanistan representatives stay away from the jirga, its results would be similar to the first Bonn Conference.

Secondly, this time around, the delegates will be appointing Ghani’s the successor, deciding on an interim set-up or some other mechanism. Dr. Abdullah sees himself the most suitable contender for this position. Whether or not the international community will endorse the Loya Jirga’s decisions remains to be seen.

Neither national consensus nor the Loya Jirga will resolve Afghanistan’s complex problems because the armed opposition will be pushed to the wall and their representatives will have no place in any of the proposed arrangements. This mean the conflict will rage on and Afghanistan will remain stomping ground for Russia and America. Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia and Iran will also keep pursuing their objectives on our soil.

If Karzai really desired lasting security in the country, he had plenty of chances during his rule. But he did not want either to make peace with the armed opposition or bring the war to an end. The Afghans have reason to believe both Karzai and Ghani are not sincere in their vows.

Ghani has been harping on the reconciliation theme to survive politically and stay ensconced in the presidential saddle, while Karzai is eyen a return to power. The best way is how we can end reliance on the presence of foreign forces in the country; how we take advantage of the America-Russian rivalry without letting them fight their proxy wars in Afghanistan.

We should also ponder ways of benefitting from the Indo-Pak brinkmanship and the Iranian-Saudi tussle, in a way consistent with our national interest. It will be possible only after peace is made with the Taliban and the Hezb-i-Islami led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar. Any peace deal should not be seen as a surrender; the neighbouring countries should not be given any leverage.

For realising these objectives, government leaders and Karzai will have to walk the talk on reconciliation. If Ghani does not demonstrably honour his commitment to peace, rifts within his administration and scheming by Karzai will provide the Taliban the opportunity to seize some provinces. Needless to say, the insurgents would push ahead with the war and the reconciliation drive will remain in limbo.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pajhwok’s editorial policy.

 

 

 

 

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