Maria and Erica Chenoweth argue that non-violent campaigns between 1900 and 2006 succeeded twice more than their violent counterparts in the given timeframe (Stephen and Chenoweth, 7). What Maria and Chenoweth mean by non-violent campaigns are active campaigns that use peaceful alternatives for waging their struggles. In Khudai Khidmatgar(1929-47) A Strategic Choice, I have wrestled with the limited research available on the strategic aspects of the movement to explore whether Khudai Khidmatgar was a strategic movement or not.

 

The available literature in general and in vernacular languages in particular on Khudai Khidmatgar, an anti-colonial movement against the British Indian rule in India in the first quarter of the 20th century, mainly treats the movement as a historical event and not as a strategic undertaking. The philosophy behind writing this book is to unveil strategic aspects of the movement and accelerate pace of the limited discussion on the strategic dimensions of Khudai Khidmatgar.

 

The definition that terms social movement as supply and demand is the basis for my research. I have tried to give a snapshot of the political, social, cultural situation and Pashtuns’ armed struggle against the British Indian rulers and that of the Pashtuns living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, known as NWFP then, first to provide a basis and logic for the emergence of Khudai Khidmatgar afterwards.

 

Pashtuns’ condition in the first quarter of the 20th century and strategic calculations in finding ways for overcoming Pashtuns’ problems dictated that the first and foremost consideration should be given to efforts for improving educational status of Pashtuns, fundamentally changing their cultural situations, bringing them closer and solving their societal problems, radically altering their mentality about their powerlessness, improving their economic situation before marshaling them towards a social movement.

 

I have found and argued in the book that Bacha Khan took the above trajectory for altering the Pashtuns’ lives. In 1910, he for the first time established a school with his own resources and the resources he had gathered from other Pashtuns. In the course of the 1910 and 1920s he extended his efforts of establishing similar schools in other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He then worked for the economic wellbeing of Pashtuns, for the Pashtuns’ unity and brotherhood, for the introduction of a new community centric ideology among the Pashtuns and by giving them social identity organized them in a social movement, which later on turned to a political movement.

 

Hardy Meriman has conditioned success of a non-violent movement with three factors of unity, plan and organization. I have come to know in my analysis that Khudai Khidmatgar, may be with a different taxonomy, possessed the stated factors. The movement possessed an unwritten strategy that was included on vision, non-violent tactics, training and education, leadership, communication and so on.

 

 I, in the book, has argued that Khudai Khidmatgar is one of the few limited movements who had put taking oath of not resorting to violence being in the movement. This shows intensity of the commitment to non-violence by the movement.The oath binds members of the movement to strictly avoid violence during their lives.

 

Besides Hardy’s stated three conditions for a successful non-violent campaign, some other experts have put overcoming of fear as another condition for a successful  non-violent campaigns. Based on the qualitative research, where primary and secondary sources have been utilized, I have argued in Khudai Khidmatgar (1929-47) A Strategic Choice that the empty handed Khudai Khidmtgar movement, without resorting to violence, waged campaign against the armed British Indian Army. They were not afraid of violent met by the British Army and their heavy handedness. The movement strongly believed in non-violence.The below Pashto Tapa exmeplies it:

 

“Da drim Jang lapara munga tayari kari di

Sarkar di bia khpal dri gazi kotak la sam wagori”

 

“ We have made preparations for the third war

The government should prepare steel tips for their three-meter wooden button”

 

Written in five chapters( the first chapter being on the socio-economic situation, literary condition, political situation and that of Pashtuns during the emergence of Khudai Khidmatgar, the second chapter being on Khudai Khidmatgar as a Strategic Choice, the third chapter being on the none-violent tactics used by Khudai Khidmatgar, the fourth chapter being on the communication in Khudai Khidmatgar and the fifth chapter being on the consequence) the book has compared dynamics of Khudai Khidmatgar with the literature on modern none-violent civic mobilization, established analogy between the two and tested it against the parameters of a strategic none-violent movement.

 

Based on my findings in the book, I have reached to a conclusion that Khudai Khidmatagr is not only a strategic but a rational choice. The book will add to the existing intellectual armory on Khudai Khidmatgar, ignite scholarly discussion about the movement and serve as a reference for the future research on strategic dimension of the Khudai Khidmatgar.

 

View expressed in this article are of the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pajhwok’s editorial policy.

 

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