Executive Summary

With a US-Taliban is again at a decisive moment where it’s political and social order and its role as a Western partner are renegotiated. The Taliban leadership seems ready to move from combat to politics. The current government crisis and hardened intra-Afghan conflicts put the pluralist-democratic achievements of the past twenty years at risk when going to the negotiation table with the Taliban. If the inner political struggles remain unsolved, Afghans risk losing all, its hard-won democracy and prospects for peace.

Introduction

On 29 February 2020, the USA signed a peace agreement with the Taliban leadership in Qatar. The agreement could put an end to almost twenty years of war and violence between the Taliban, the Afghan government and international NATO forces. The agreement regulates the withdrawal of foreign troops – a long-standing demand of the Taliban movement – an anti-terror guarantee on the part of the Taliban, the modalities for a comprehensive ceasefire and the start of intra-Afghan negotiations. With the Taliban’s intended international legalisation and participation in the government in Kabul, the political and societal order of the Afghan Republic is up for negotiation for the first time since the fall of the Taliban Emirate in 2001.

On 18 February 2020, only two weeks before the signing of the U.S.-Taliban peace deal and almost five months after the Afghan presidential elections in September last year, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced the final election results. As expected, incumbent President Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner with 50.64 percent of the vote. Second was the current head of government, CEO Abdullah, with 39.52 percent. With the announcement of the official election results, the political polarization between Ghani supporters and opponents, above all the camp of former CEO Abdullah, had critically intensified. The main political rivals accuse President Ghani’s team of election fraud.

With a U.S.-Taliban agreement on a NATO troop’s withdrawal signed, a critical government crisis after contested presidential elections and intra-Afghan peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government in the making, Afghanistan is again at a defining turning point where its political system, national identity and role as a Western partner may be renegotiated.

This paper gives an overview on the current political developments and conditions for peace, inherent weaknesses in the post-2001 Afghan political setting and asks about what would be at stake in intra-Afghan negotiations if the Taliban (co-)ruled the government in Kabul again.

Roadmap to Peace: From Bilateral to Intra-Afghan

2019 started as a promising year. When the USA began official peace talks with the Taliban for the first time in Doha, Qatar in February 2019, there was great optimism that a new chapter in the almost 20-year conflict between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and NATO forces might begin. This was the closest the country has come to a political solution since 2001.

On 29 February 2020, the USA signed a bilateral agreement with the Taliban leadership in Doha, Qatar. The agreement outlines a roadmap to a peaceful political settlement covering four main areas: (1) the withdrawal of foreign troops, (2) an anti-terrorism guarantee by the Taliban, (3) the question of a comprehensive ceasefire and (4) the start of intra-Afghan negotiations. The main hurdle to peace is now to include the Afghan government into the peace agreement and transform the bilateral U.S.-Taliban roadmap into an inclusive intra-Afghan process.

(1) Withdrawal of troops

The agreement regulates the withdrawal of foreign troops, the longstanding core demand of the Taliban. The USA has agreed to a successive reduction of its troops from more than 12,000 to 8,600 within 135 days (by mid-July 2020) and is holding out the prospect of a total withdrawal of all U.S. and NATO troops within 14 months (by April 2021).

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had declared the continuation of international support for the Afghan security sector. The international community finances the salaries and maintenance of the Afghan Security and Defence Forces (ANDSF).[1] The United States finance roughly half of the Afghan national security budget and almost fully the Afghan armed forces (AAF). The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are financed and trained by the international community through the UNDP Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). Security analysts had repeatedly warned that a critical US disengagement from the security sector without further support would lead to the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDF).[2]

(2) Taliban anti-terrorism guarantee

The Taliban have given a guarantee that they will not provide protection or assistance to terrorist groups such as to al-Qaida, the Islamic State of Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) or to any other groups and individuals that pose a threat against the United States or its allies. The Taliban’s refusal in 2001 to hand over al-Qaida chief Usama bin Ladin after the 9/11 attacks and cut their alleged links to Al-Qaida were the initial reason for the U.S. and NATO military engagement and toppling of the Taliban regime.

(3) Comprehensive and permanent ceasefire

The modalities for a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire are to be negotiated in intra-Afghan negotiations. A seven-day reduction of violence, agreed by the USA and the Taliban, preceded the signing of the bilateral peace deal on February 29. The reduction of violence was a major confidence-building measure and statement of mutual commitment. In contrast to a comprehensive ceasefire, the reduction of violence was a face-saving compromise and lowered pressure on both sides as defectors are expected to continue to spoil the process. A permanent ceasefire remains the core demand of the Afghan government and the main bargaining chip of the Taliban.

(4) Intra-Afghan negotiations

Intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and a broad Afghan delegation of government and other political and civil societal actors are to negotiate the modalities of the Taliban’s political integration and participation in the government in Kabul, as well as the path towards a new constitution. For peace negotiations, the Afghan government must propose a list of negotiators accepted by all sides. With regard to the current government crisis and polarisation between President Ashraf Ghani and his challengers, most notably Abdullah, this seems extremely difficult.

The agreement regulates that intra-Afghan negotiations are to be preceded by a mutual release of prisoners as a confidence-building measure: The Afghan government is to release 5,000 (out of over 10,000) Taliban prisoners; the Taliban are to release 1,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers held as prisoners by them. The prisoners release remains a delicate issue and core demand of the Taliban. The Taliban demand the full and unconditional release of 5.000 fighters according to their list and a priori to the negotiations. The Ghani government, however, offers a successive and conditions-based release. The government does not feel bound by a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Taliban, of which it was not a contracting party.

According to the bilateral U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, the USA will – within the framework of the intra-Afghan negotiations and after examination – lift its sanctions against the Taliban movement (self-designated as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) by 27 August 2020. The United States also pledged to lobby UNSR members to equally effect a lifting of international sanctions against the Taliban.[3] In addition, the USA stated its will to seek positive economic relations with the new government emerging from the peace process and to refrain from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Government in Crisis

On 18 February 2020, almost five months after the Afghan presidential elections in September last year and only two weeks ahead of the signing of the US-Taliban peace agreement, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the final election results. As expected, incumbent President Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner with 50.64 percent of the vote. Second was the by then head of government (CEO), Abdullah Abdullah, with 39.52 percent.

With election results announced, the already intense political polarization between Ghani supporters and opponents, above all his main challenger Abdullah, had critically intensified. Opponents to President Ghani accused his team of election fraud. The international community remained conspicuously silent and observant the first days after the announced results. India, one of the Afghan government’s closest political allies, was among the first states to congratulate Ghani on his election victory.

On 09 March, Ashraf Ghani hold his presidential inauguration ceremony in the Presidential Palace (Arg) in Kabul in the presence of Western and international diplomats. At the same time, in Sapidar Palace within the Arg premises, Abdullah declared himself state president in the presence of Afghan political figures such as former Mujahideen commanders Abdul Rashid Dostum (formerly allied with Ghani) and Muhammad Mohaqiq.

The contest of President Ghani’s second term came at an unfavourable time. For the forthcoming intra-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban, the political divisions and polarisation are weakening the political solidarity and unity that is needed to defend the values of the Afghan Republic against the Taliban’s demands for an Islamic Emirate.

Fragmentation, but no Separatism

Despite the dangerous political polarization that is currently peaking and sometimes simplified as a natural ethnic-regional divide, political opinions and loyalties are more complex. Political loyalties in government and parliament as well as voting behavior are usually told to be fractured along ethnic, tribal, regional or sectarian cleavages and power brokers. They are, however, fluid and flexible and, as currently seen in the shifting of political alliances, often based on opportunistic calculations.

Political loyalties and trust are often given to political figures or power brokers who have personal links or roots in the own community. However, identities and faultlines overlap and run at different levels. At times, loyalties and interests may be more defined by personal obligations or feuds, sometimes identities and feelings of belonging are more defined by the region (manteqa) rather than ethnicity (qawm).[4]

Despite tribal, ethnic, regional or linguistic fragmentations, there is no separatist or secessionist movement in Afghanistan. Neither is there the desire of ethnic groups to join their fellows in the neighbour countries, such as Tajiks joining Tajikistan, Uzbeks joining Uzbekistan, Turkmen joining Turkmenistan, or Pashtuns joining Pakistan.[5] Until the present day, Afghans have found a unitary state as more advantageous and protective against foreign influence and meddling.[6]

The current government crisis is less an ethnic (Pashto/non-Pashtu) or regional (Kabul vs. North) divide. It may rather reveal a fragmentation along inter-generational and inter-elite conflicts between a declining but still powerful political class of former Mujahideen freedom fighters and a small intellectual-cosmopolitan, non-Mujahideen elite currently in government. It shows the contest by former political elites of military commanders and tribal leaders for lost power and influence.

The new post-Taliban generation

The current government crisis also expresses a generational conflict and the polarization between an empowered generation of young, urbanized and cosmopolitan Afghans and the perceived marginalized political class of former Mujahideen fighters who had formed the new social and political elite after the Russian invasion in 1979.

Afghanistan has one of the youngest societies in the world. 40 percent of the population is under the age of 15 years, more than 60 percent is under 25.[7] The majority of the population in the government-controlled areas knows the Mujahideen fighting and life under the Taliban rule in the 1990s only from stories and media.

Thanks to President Ghani’s modernization and rejuvenation of the state bureaucracy, the new generation is already in high-profile government positions. In the Afghan government and diplomatic service, a number of deputy ministers and ambassadors are under the age of 30, including women.

Ghani’s modernization policy also had its price. Similarly to the top-down modernization policy of King Amanullah Khan a hundred years ago, the reorganisation under the Ghani administration has upset parts of the conservative establishment, tribal elders and elites, and first and foremost, the political class of former Mujahideen fighters. Critique and prejudice against a young, internationally educated governmental elite under the age of 30, often holding dual citizenships, has upset those Afghans that have similarly suffered or fought under the Taliban regime, and now feel left behind or sidelined.

Weaknesses and Flaws in the Afghan Political System

Not only the government and political power brokers, but the political system as a whole has remained weakened and in parts dysfunctional. Some dysfunctions are rooted in the constitutional or legal setup. Others are grounded in the lack of implementation or observance of legal norms when informal justice or social habits predominate.

The drafters of the current Constitution of 2004 intended to design a presidential system with a strong head of state who would be constrained by a parliament vested with strong oversight and legislative powers.[8] In practice, the executive was split since 2014 between a President and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a quasi-head of government not provided for in the constitution. This power triangle between the President, the CEO and the parliament has been marked by hostilities and destructive blockade policies.

The lack of credible and disciplined political parties has facilitated a fragmented and weak parliament, unable to present united coalition fronts towards an executive dominance. Since 2005, only five laws that were passed came of the parliament’s initiative, as there is no effective parliamentary group. The Presidential Palace has been the dominating power in ruling and initiating laws and policies.[9]

The Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, applied in Afghanistan and only a few countries worldwide, even more facilitates the personalization and fragmentation of opinions, distorts the representativity to the benefit of minorities and marginalizes the role of political parties for aggregating opinions and votes.

Executive and legislative powers have been, at times, overstretched or misused against each other. At times, the government sidelined the parliament or simply ignored legislative decisions.[10] But also parliament members did not hesitate to misuse their legislative oversight powers such as no-confidence votes or the right to impeach government ministers for their own retaliatory or individual purposes.[11]

Legal security and access to justice is weak. In provinces and districts where government justice is weak or the Taliban prevail, informal justice systems or Taliban courts have become a well-received alternative to state courts for daily disputes. Where judgments of state courts have the reputation of requiring lengthy procedures and the payment of bribes, Taliban courts are told to be fast, unbiased and non-corrupt. The legitimacy and legal status of Taliban courts put aside, their popular reputation vis-à-vis state courts weakens the popular trust in the republican institutions which is urgently needed.

Corruption is endemic in state and public institutions as well as in foreign-funded state-building projects. At the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Afghanistan ranks on place 173 (out of 180).[12] The post-2001 international reconstruction has strengthened structures of neo-patrimonial governance. State offices in government, parliament, justice or educational institutions are seen as places of self-enrichment and personal insurance. This adds to the value of and competition for state offices or parliamentarian seats and undermines the morality and protection of those officials who want to carry out their duties honestly and conscientiously.

Trade off between Peace and Democracy?

With the resumption of the peace process in 2018 between the United States and the Taliban, the so-called “Doha process”, many democracy activists and advocates for human and women rights fear that Afghanistan’s liberal-democratic achievements may be sacrificed for the sake of peace. Many of them see a considerable risk that the foreign troops withdrawal without political guarantees could leave the political sway to the Taliban and endanger the democratic achievements.

In the Doha process, the Taliban continue to advocate for an Islamic Emirate. For the Afghan government and civil society, the question remains to what extent the Taliban’s political attitude and willingness to compromise has changed since the 1990s. Would the Taliban agree to the protection of fundamental liberal-pluralist rights? Will they accept peaceful transitions of power by means of democratic elections?

The intra-Afghan negotiations will put the political system and the social order back on the negotiating table. In the Doha process, the Taliban had already announced that a constitutional amendment was a necessary condition for the implementation of a peace agreement.

What it would mean in detail remains unclear. The Taliban leadership is keeping a low profile on the question of the concrete form of an Islamic state or emirate for several reasons. For one thing, the Taliban do not want to make concrete political promises in advance and by this give up their negotiating cards. Nor do they want to deter the other side with political demands right from the start.[13] Secondly, they have no elaborated vision or idea of what an Islamic state could look like for a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, culturally diverse and globally connected Afghan society.

Unlike other Islamist movements, the Taliban movement does not have a sophisticated political ideology based on a binding, written, theoretical framework. Rather, according to Islamic scholars, the Taliban movement is held together by a common creed.[14] The political Taliban leadership in Qatar is anxious to present the Taliban movement as a homogeneous and unified group that is bound together by a clear conviction and command structure.

Emirate vs. Republic: What to expect from a Taliban Power-sharing in Kabul?

With regard to the Taliban’s willingness to compromise, one can only speculate on the basis of the experiences during the Taliban rule of the 1990s, of reports from Taliban-controlled districts, and of what the Taliban leadership communicates on its media portals.

The intra-Afghan negotiations and a national reconciliation process will have to address the questions of power-sharing, power transitions and governance, the status of human rights and individual freedoms, and Afghanistan’s foreign relations with its neighbours and the international community.

Religious vs. Democratic Legitimacy

In the Doha process, the Taliban leadership emphasized that it does not claim sole dominance, but would agree to share power. It is unclear if the Taliban would also agree to democratic shifts in power and to a democratic legitimacy of the state. This will be the thin line between an Islamic Emirate and the current Islamic Republic. The Taliban deputy leader Sirajuddin Haqqani stated that the kind of (Islamic) government depends on the consensus among Afghans.[15] In intra-Afghan negotiations, the Taliban will advocate for the inclusion of theocratic elements in the constitution, but may possibly compromise with an Islamic Republic which would be highly overseen by religious Mullahs or a religious scholar-elite (Ulama).

Just like its two neighbour countries Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic. It is, however, clearly different from the Islamic Republic of Iran, a hybrid system of theocratic and democratic elements in which the state is also responsible for defining and enforcing social morals. A state in which democratic elections and changes of power take place only below a council of guardians (as in Iran) or an Islamic shura council could possibly be a semi-democratic and republican model that the Taliban may engage in.[16] The Taliban leadership would welcome a certain democratic or popular legitimacy as well as the international recognition as long as it does not threaten their share in power and their main concepts of society.

Women Rights, Public Morality and Gender Policy

The question of women rights and gender policy under a new Taliban-ruled government in Kabul occupies many debates. In the 1990s, the main changes the Taliban regime imposed on society were related to the freedoms of women and gender, most notably the right of women to education, to work and to participate and appear in public.[17] The ban on women to work and their restriction of mobility in public had the severest immediate impact, also because many families existentially relied on the income of women.

In the current Doha peace process, the Taliban announced to guarantee women’s rights in accordance with Islamic values. Their narrative circles around providing protection for women and omits the question of women participation.  Its leadership acknowledges women’s right to education and work but demands the observance of an Islamic dress code such as wearing the veil (hijab).[18]

In strictly Islamic but well-educated countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, women are increasingly conquering the job market and make up half of university students. For Saudi or Iranian middle-class women, it is common to strive for high education and professional careers, under the observance of gender segregation and Islamic dress codes in public.

A Taliban-ruled government would probably seek to apply similar regulations in Afghanistan. Even if Taliban will not demand a ban on women education or work, Afghan women will probably find it much harder to acquire high-ranking government positions and even be formally banned from taking certain state positions such as state judges or state president.

Gender segregation is still very common in Afghanistan’s conservative and male-dominated society. School education is largely gender-separated; co-education is only practiced at university and partly in elementary schools. Also the dress code of both women and men, including the urban centers and the capital Kabul, are highly conservative and respecting Islamic morality codes.

The main changes a Taliban co-ruled government in Kabul would therefore bring to the post-2001 liberal-democratic achievements must be rather expected in the content of education and in the freedom of expression and thinking.

Media Pluralism and Freedom of Expression

One of Afghanistan’s main achievements of the post-2001 order is its considerably free and pluralistic media landscape which is unique compared to the state-controlled media in the regional neighbour countries. Even though media outlets have been economically struggling over the past years, and are often financed and influenced by political power brokers, Afghanistan has a remarkable and flourishing debate culture and freedom of expression. At the same time, the country’s precarious security situation makes it one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists. According to Reporters Without Borders, it therefore ranks 121st out of 180 in the global ranking of press freedom.[19]

What seems to be most under threat under a co-ruled Taliban government would be today’s open debate culture in public media, university life and civil society. The pluralist media landscape and the content of the education system would probably be the first areas that Taliban politicians would attempt to transform.

Foreign Policy and Relations with the International Community

Since their emergence to power in 1995, the Taliban movement has sought international recognition. However, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had acknowledged their declared Islamic Emirate until its toppling in 2001. The Taliban’s motivation is two-sided. On the one hand, the leadership wants to get out of international isolation and sanctions. According to their present statements, they seek good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours and the international community. The Taliban leadership has stated its interest to keep the international community engaged in Afghanistan to secure postwar development and reconstruction aid.[20]

On the other hand, even though the political leadership sends the message that they do not pursue an isolationist approach, they demand from foreign countries to stop interfering in Afghanistan’s domestic political, social or cultural affairs and endeavour to re-install Afghanistan’s full sovereignty and independence.[21] The Taliban leadership announced to be committed to international law and conventions as long as they are compatible with Islamic principles.[22]

Under a Taliban co-ruled government, the foreign relations of Afghanistan would shift. It would possibly diversify its foreign relations and look out for non-Western partners like Russia, China, Turkey, or even Iran. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the current host country of the Taliban leadership, could make use of their privileged relations and ideological closeness with the Islamist movement. Yet, the Taliban leadership is cautious not to become a minion of any foreign country, including Pakistan.[23] With India, the largest regional donor country (even before China) and the closest regional ally of the current Afghan government, a Taliban-led government would not have a similarly warm and close relationship. Yet, in the past decades of various sorts of support from Pakistan, the Taliban leadership has been keen to keep itself out of the Indian-Pakistani conflict.

Outlook: Republic at Stake?

Last year, Afghanistan commemorated 100 years of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919, which brought full sovereignty from British tutelage to Afghanistan under King Amanullah Khan. A hundred years after its independence, Afghanistan remains politically, militarily and financially dependent on foreign allies and vulnerable to external conflicts of power and interests. The Kulturkampf started more than one hundred years ago between religious conservative, new radical Islamist, and liberal-secular thinking is still to be settled. This contest of ideas is today overlapped by an inter-generational and inter-elite conflict between a still powerful political elite of former Mujahideen freedom fighters and a new technocrat intellectual elite currently in government. Both of them claim to be the guardians and representatives of the Afghan Republic vis-à-vis the Taliban.

Twenty years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan is once again at a defining turning point where the political system, national identity and role as a Western partner are being renegotiated. For the war-weary population, the prospect of a ceasefire and the freedom of movement and quality of life that it will bring is a priority. The Taliban leadership seems willing to move from combat to politics. In order to secure the achievements of freedom and achieve a sustainable peace, all sections of society must work for national reconciliation and social cohesion within the highly fragmented, suspicious and traumatised Afghan society. Furthermore, to be sustainable, the intra-Afghan reconciliation must be meaningfully complemented by an intra-regional dialogue.

Reference List

Barfield, Thomas: Afghanistan. A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012).

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, accessed 09-03-2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Cordesman, Anthony: Afghanistan: “Peace” as the Vietnamization of a U.S. Withdrawal? (Washington D.C., CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020).

Giustozzi, Antonio: Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop (London, Hurst Publishers, 2007).

Gohari, M. J.: The Taliban Ascent to Power (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).

Haqqani, Sirajuddin: What We, the Taliban, Want, The New York Times, February 20, 2020.

International Organization for Migration (IOM): A Third of Afghans Have Migrated or Been Displaced Since 2012, Kabul, 2019, accessed 01-02-2020, https://www.iom.int/news/third-afghans-have-migrated-or-been-displaced-2….

Institute for Economics & Peace: Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2019, accessed 01-31-2019, http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, http://alemarahenglish.com.

Marsden, Peter: The Taliban. War and Religion in Afghanistan (New York, Palgrave, 2002).

Pasarlay, Shamshad/Mallyar, Zalmay: The Afghan Parliament: Constitutional Mandate versus the Practice in the Post 2001 Context (Kabul, AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2019).

Ruttig, Thomas: Outside, Inside. Afghanistan’s paradoxical political party system (2001-16), (Kabul, Afghanistan Analysts Network/Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, May 2018).

Saikal, Amin: Modern Afghanistan. A History of Struggle and Survival (London, I.B. Tauris, 2012).

Tomsen, Peter: The Wars of Afghanistan. Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York, Public Affairs, 2013).

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index, assessed on 13-03-2020, https://www.transparency.org/country/AFG.

Zeino, Ellinor: Gefangen im Sicherheitsdilemma. Die afghanisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen (Bonn, Südasien, 3/2019), pp. 18-22.

Zeino, Ellinor: New Great Games. Regional Interests in the Afghan Peace Process (Berlin, KAS International Reports, Vol. 4, 2019), p. 64-74.

UNSR: Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, 10-02-2020, assessed on 13-03-2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/subsidiary_organs_factsheet.pdf.

 

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[23] See Zeino, Ellinor: Gefangen im Sicherheitsdilemma. Die afghanisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen (Bonn, Südasien, 3/2019).

 

“A longer version of the article was previously published in the Orient Journal in Berlin.”

View expressed in this article are of the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pajhwok’s editorial policy.

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