President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan neither thoughtless nor a mistake. It was well-thought-out decision that should be duly respected. Ghani opened a new chapter in bilateral relations with Pakistan. In spite of India’s position as a strategic and historical friend, the Afghan government moved one step further and signed anMoU on intelligence cooperation with Pakistan.

President Ghani’spolicy of engagement with Pakistan’s security establishment spurred hopes within Afghan political and social circles. It looked there was a real desire among Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders to author a new chapter in relations with the new Afghan government.

In quest of lasting peace, Ghani moved fast, perhaps very fast, to sort out all differences with Pakistan. In the thick energy, security and economic woes, Pakistan looks more vulnerable than Afghanistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had promised during his elections campaign to boostthe economy, put an end to the energy crisis, enhance investment, restore peace, eliminate poverty and improve relations with India and Afghanistan.

On June 5, 2013, Sharif was elected as a prime minister but he has since been unable to keep his campaign promises. The reason is simple and straight: The military establishment still controls foreign policy on Afghanistan, India and Kashmir. 

In November 2013, the PM appointed Gen. Raheel Sharif as new chief of army staff (COAS) replacing Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Sharif ignored the principle of seniority, which would have given Lt. Gen. Haroon Aslam the COAS slot. The reason behind the appointment of Raheel Sharif was to enhance his hold on the army, which could help the civilian establishment to control foreign policy on Afghanistan, India, China, the US and Kashmir. 

The army chief is perhaps the most powerful person in Pakistan, with the military having ruled that country for more than half of its 66-year history. Pakistan’s civilian leadership undoubtedly has the will to resolve all issues with Afghanistan. However, its security establishment keeps changing its Afghan policy. Over the past nine months, Sharif, his army chief and the ISI with messages of sincere support and cooperation in the peace process.

Sincerity vs. duplicity

Ghani has initiated a string of sincere measures to improve ties with Pakistan. His main intention is to push Pakistan for reconciliation with the Taliban. He also sent six Afghan National Army (ANA) cadets for 18 months of military training in Pakistan– anoffer that was persistently declined by his predecessor Hamid Karzai.

Other initiatives include handing over alleged perpetrators of the Army school massacre in Peshawar, mounting pressure TTP militants, providing access to ISI agents to investigate anti-Pakistan elements in Afghan jails, coordinating border patrols, ensuring Pakistan’s access to Central Asia and prioritising warm ties with Islamabad.

In an unprecedented move, the neighbours went on to sign an intelligence-sharing agreement, which triggered domestic outcry in Afghanistan. Indeed both MoU on intelligence cooperation and the proposal to send Afghan cadets for training at the Pakistani Military Academy triggered sharp criticism from the public and political elite.

New hopes were raised when the first-ever direct talks — supported by the US and China — were hosted by Pakistan in Murree. However, yet again, spoilers scuttled the second round of peace talks. The trust built between the two sides was significantly damaged by a new round of blame game initiated in Kabul.

Due to overwhelming pressure from political and social circles and disappointment over barbaric bombings in Kabul, Ghani ran out of patience and pointed an accusing finger at Pakistan on August 10. “We can no longer tolerate watching our people bleeding in a war exported and imposed on us from outside,” he told a media briefing in Kabul.

First Vice President Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, CEO Abdullah and NDS followed suit, accusing Pakistan of contributing to insecurity in Afghanistan. Political and defence analysts in Pakistan believe Ghani has taken practical steps to address Islamabad’s concerns. They say it is Islamabad’s turn to demonstrate its desire for cordial ties. 

A number of Afghan politicians claim Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan has produced nothing. However, His critical remarks against Pakistan after last month’s high-profile terrorist attacks in Kabul and a series of allegations by NDS have widened the trust deficit.

Taliban split

Huge differences have surfaced among the Taliban after the announcement of Mullah Omar’s demise. Pakistan’s ultimate goal appears to be splitting the movement into three groups to convince China, the US and other Western countries into supporting the Afghan peace process. Pakistan will push one group for reconciliation with the Afghan government, keep supporting a second to fuel the insurgency and retain the third faction as a reserve force. But splitting up the Taliban will not help Afghans; instead it will complicate the peace process by helping Daesh to expand its presence across the country.

Options for Afghanistan

From the 2001 Bonn Conference until now, Pakistan has been closely monitoring the situation in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, Pakistan views the unity government as a weak, paralysed and internally-fractured administration, which will probably collapse soon. Despite the huge foot- print of foreign forces in Afghanistan during the past 13 years, Islamabad believes, the government in Kabul could not bring peace and stability to the country.

How can the present government bring security and peace in the presence of fewer foreign forces? This utter miscalculation prompts Pakistan’s security establishment to keep following its policy of strategic depth, seeing Afghanistan as a client state and trying to administerKabul from Islamabad’.

Senior Afghan analysts and politicians believe the Durand Line does not have a high level of significance now that most of the Pashtuns living across the border do not want to integrate into Afghanistan. Pakistan wants Afghanistan to support its stance on Kashmir, water disputes and access to Central Asia. Islamabad also wants Kabul to consider its advice on the appointment of senior officials, direct security institutions to target Baloch separatists on Afghan soil and check India’s growing influence.

Afghanistan is not a priority any longer for the US and its allies, following crises in the Middle East, Ukraine and massive immigration. In fact, Afghanistan has dropped to fourth position on the international agenda and Pakistan has realised this. Pakistan will not bow to US pressure on cooperation with Afghanistan, as the Obama administration is busy preparing for new elections. Until the end of 2016 when foreign forces are to pull out of Afghanistan, Pakistan will be simply buying time by coming up with new tactics in dealing with the Ghani government. After 2016, Pakistan will assess the situation and decide on what to do in Afghanistan. In this period, the unity government should pursue following options:

One:

Both leaders of the national unity government should share their vision instead of sharing power. They must put aside their differences to promote good governance, eliminate corruption, boost the economy, generate jobs, implement reform and, above all, deliver badly-needed services. This will contribute to improved security and enhancing people’s trust in the government.

Two:

The government must work on a comprehensive plan for the repatriation of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. As long as our refugees are in Pakistan, Afghanistan will remain vulnerable. Majority of the insurgents interact with Afghan refugees living in Pakistan-based camps.

Three:

Afghanistan’s political leadership must convince the US, China and other stakeholders to pressure Pakistan to sincerely cooperate in brining lasting peace to the war-torn country. Otherwise the international community, particularly the US and China should push for Pakistan’s isolation.  Throughout history, when tensions flare up between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US intentionally or unintentionally support the latter. However, China is worried about the threat from some of its own Islamist militants in the western province of Xinjiang currently fighting in the borderlands near the Durand line. China may pressure Pakistan for this reason.

Four:

President Ghani, unlike his predecessor, should focus on winning the confidence of the US and its allies. This trust had been breached considerably by former president Hamid Karzai. Afghanistan must prove to US and other Western countries that it remains a reliable and long-term partner.

Five:

The national unity government should reach out to Taliban to resolve differences through an intra-Afghan dialogue rather than begging Pakistan to support the peace process. This could be achieved by creating a small team of mediators acceptable to both parties, which should also include reconciled and influential Taliban members based in Kabul. At the meantime, the Afghan government should establish a special cell on Pakistan.

Six:

India should not be kept on standby anymore. Kabul should approach Delhi for the weapons and military tools needed to fight the insurgency. In the meantime, the government should continue working with Pakistan on improving bilateral relations in areas of trade, culture, education and politics. We cannot afford to snap all ties with Pakistan, a neighbour sharing more than a 2,000-km border with Afghanistan.

Views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pajhwok’s editorial policy

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